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Abstract – Genetic modification of crops has revolutionized food production, but it 
remains controversial due to food safety and environmental concerns. A recent food 
safety scare provides a natural experiment on the corn market’s willingness to accept 
unapproved genetically modified organisms. In 2000, a genetically modified corn variety 
called StarLink was discovered in the food-corn supply, even though it was not approved 
for human consumption. To estimate the price impact of this event, we develop the 
relative price of a substitute method, which applies not only to the StarLink event but also 
to rare events in other markets. We apply this method to measure the price impact of the 
StarLink contamination on the U.S. corn market. We find that the contamination led to a 
7 percent suppression of corn prices that lasted for at least a year. 
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I. Introduction 
Globally, plantings of the four main biotech crops (corn, cotton, soybeans, and canola) 
increased from 4 million acres in 1995 to 222 million acres in 2005. Almost 25 percent of global 
corn acres are now planted to genetically modified (GM) varieties. Compared to traditional plant 
breeding, genetic modification produces new varieties of plants more quickly and efficiently, and 
it introduces desirable traits into plants such as resistance to herbicides, insects, disease, drought 
and salts in the soil. Furthermore, ongoing GM crop research programs aim to improve the 
nutritional quality of food.  
There exist huge potential benefits to producers, consumers, and the environment from GM 
crop technology. However, widespread controversy surrounds the commercial production and 
marketing of GM food. Much of the opposition to this technology is centered in the European 
Union. Opponents of GM technology claim that there may exist unknown health risks to those 
who consume GM food, and GM crops could impose huge costs on society by reducing 
biodiversity.  
In this article, we assess the willingness of the market to accept contamination of the food 
supply by an unapproved GM corn variety called StarLink. In 1998, the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) licensed StarLink for commercial production for animal feed and non-
food industrial products but, unlike most other GM corn, the EPA did not approve StarLink for 
human consumption. Nonetheless, StarLink became commingled with non-StarLink corn and 
entered the human food supply. This commingling became public knowledge on September 18, 
2000, when The Washington Post reported that traces of StarLink had been detected in taco 
shells.  In the months that followed, hundreds of food products were recalled, scores of corn 
shipments were redirected, and several lawsuits were brought against Aventis CropScience, the 
developer of StarLink. 
The StarLink contamination event constitutes a natural experiment. Accordingly, this article 
complements the existing literature, which typically uses laboratory experiments to estimate price   3
discounts associated with GM food safety risk (e.g., Lusk et al. 2004, Shogren et. al. 1994). 
Natural experiments have several advantages over laboratory experiments (Harrison and List 
2004). First, natural experiments enable an economist to observe the behavior of economic agents 
participating in actual markets rather than under artificial conditions. Second, the stakes are 
typically much higher and therefore more realistic in natural experiments. It would be difficult to 
simulate in a laboratory a global food safety scare like StarLink. Nevertheless, as Harrison and 
List point out, the market setting of a natural experiment eliminates any control of the economist 
over the experiment. Thus, it may be difficult to make reliable inference about the market effects 
of the event under study. 
To overcome this difficulty for the StarLink case, we develop a new method that will be also 
useful for estimating the price impacts of other significant news events in commodity markets. 
Several methods for estimating price impacts exist in the literature. The most prominent methods 
are: (i) a simple comparison of average prices before and after the event, (ii) event studies, and 
(iii) a comparison of observed prices with predicted prices from a structural supply and demand 
model. We develop the relative price of a substitute (RPS) method, which exploits the 
equilibrium properties of the relative price of the commodity of interest to a substitute good. 
Heuristically, if the relative price is stable before the event but exhibits a structural break after the 
event, then preferences or relative technology must have been changed by the event. To estimate 
the magnitude of the price impact, we use forecasts from a cointegration model of the two prices. 
We find that StarLink contamination lowered U.S. corn prices by about 7 percent for at least a 
year. 
The article proceeds as follows. In Section II, we discuss the U.S. corn market and the 
StarLink incident. We develop the RPS method for determining the price impact in Section III, 
before presenting results for the StarLink case in Section IV and the conclusion in Section V.     4
II.  The U.S. Corn Market and the StarLink Incident 
“Literally hundreds of barges and thousands of trucks and rail cars have been redirected as a 
result of containing extremely low levels of Cry9C-containing (i.e., StarLink) corn.” 
(Gadsby, p.5)   
 
  The United States is the world’s largest producer and exporter of corn, accounting for about 
40 percent of global output and 65 percent of world corn exports.  U.S. corn growers produce 
about 9.5 billion bushels per year (240 million metric tons), which translates into more than $17 
billion in revenue for farmers.  In most years about 60 percent of the annual U.S. corn harvest is 
fed domestically to cattle, hogs, chickens and other animals, and about 5 percent goes to non-food 
industrial uses, such as ethanol production. An additional 15 percent of the annual supply is used 
domestically for food products and 20 percent is exported. Approximately one third of annual 
U.S. corn exports go to Japan, a market that was dramatically affected by the StarLink event. 
Aventis CropScience, a French multinational corporation, developed StarLink corn, and 
farmers first commercially grew it in the United States in 1998. Unlike most other GM corn, the 
U.S. government did not approve StarLink for human consumption. Instead, the EPA issued a 
“split” license, approving the corn as safe only for animal consumption and non-food industrial 
uses. StarLink was not approved for human consumption because it contained Cry9C, a protein 
that might cause allergic reactions in some humans. Cry9C is toxic to European corn borers and 
other insects, a desirable characteristic for bio-engineered corn.  
  On September 18, 2000 The Washington Post reported the detection of traces of StarLink in 
taco shells in the United States. Two months earlier, in July 2000, the EPA had received reports 
alleging adverse events linked to corn food products (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2001). 
As early as January 2000, Aventis sent the results of a farmer survey to the EPA, which showed 
that some StarLink corn was sold into channels where it should not have gone.
1 Even though 
companies selling StarLink claimed that they instructed growers to keep it separate from other 
                                                           
1 New York Times, “1999 Survey on Gene-Altered Corn Disclosed Some Improper Uses” Section C, p.2, 
September 4, 2001.   5
crops, a number of growers claimed they never received any such warning.
2 These anecdotes 
suggest that the Washington Post story was not the first indication of contamination. In fact, in 
this paper we find that contamination first affected the corn market in July 2000. 
The Washington Post story led to immediate food recalls of approximately 300 food products 
(Lin, Price, and Allen, 2002) and the fallout soon spilled into foreign markets. On October 26 
2000, reports indicated the presence of StarLink corn in snack foods and animal feed in Japan 
(Taylor and Tick, 2001), the largest single foreign customer of U.S. corn. At the time of the 
contamination, StarLink was not approved for animal feed or human consumption in Japan. 
Similar discoveries of StarLink were reported in South Korea, where StarLink was not approved 
for any use. In addition, traces of StarLink were found in the Canadian corn supply, jeopardizing 
Canadian corn exports to Japan. The EU also expressed concern that some food products 
imported from the U.S. might contain StarLink.  
In late September 2000, Aventis announced a plan to buy StarLink corn back from farmers 
under the supervision of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Aventis extended this 
program, which offered a 25 cents premium per bushel, to grain elevators in October 2000. The 
repurchased StarLink corn was redirected to use for animal feed, where it traded at about a 5 
percent discount relative to non-StarLink corn, although in the early stages of the incident the 
price discount reached as high as 10 percent (Lin et al. 2002). Formal analysis of price differences 
between StarLink and non-StarLink corn is infeasible because reliable data do not exist and 
because of difficulty in certifying non-StarLink corn for trade in spot markets. Furthermore, the 
existence of a two-tiered market was tempered by the fact that corn futures contracts on the 
                                                           
2 In the fall of 2000, the Iowa Attorney General launched an investigation of a mailing of letters by Aventis 
to StarLink growers. The letters were reportedly mailed after the contamination became public knowledge 
and enclosed with the letters were copies of agreements the growers were asked to sign and return to 
Aventis. The letters were backdated to April 2000. The New York Times reported that many StarLink 
farmers had not signed such agreements and were unaware of restrictions on use of StarLink (New York 
Times, “1999 Survey on Gene-Altered Corn Disclosed Some Improper Uses” Section C, p.2, September 4, 
2001.)    6
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) could be filled with StarLink corn before and after September 
18, 2000.  
Aventis voluntarily withdrew registration for StarLink in mid October 2000. This withdrawal 
and the buyback programs meant that no StarLink corn should have been planted in the 2001 and 
subsequent crop years. Thus, StarLink was only produced in three years, 1998, 1999, and 2000. 
Production peaked in 2000, when StarLink was planted on 350,000 acres, producing about 52.5 
million bushels. This volume constituted less than 1 percent of the total U.S. corn crop. Despite 
the small volume, StarLink contamination was widespread. Table 1 shows that, between April 
and September 2000, 67 percent of feed corn shipments destined for Japan tested positive for 
StarLink. The measurable proportion of positive tests declined to 47 percent from October 2000 
to March 2001, and then to 15 percent from April to September 2001. This evidence indicates that 
StarLink had contaminated the corn supply a few months before the September Washington Post 
story and that the contamination persisted long after production of StarLink officially ceased. In 
December 2002, more than two years after StarLink was withdrawn from the market, a cargo of 
food corn shipped to Japan tested positive for StarLink. US corn processors and Japanese 
importers continued monitoring and testing for StarLink through 2005. 
According to U.S. Embassy staff in Tokyo, “Due to the StarLink issue, imports of U.S. corn 
fell about 1.3 million metric tons in CY2001, a drop of 8 percent” (USDA, Foreign Agricultural 
Service, GAIN Report #JA2001). This drop is evident in Figure 1, which shows the weekly 
volume of U.S. corn export sales to Japan from April 2000 through March 2001. The solid line in 
Figure 1 traces weekly U.S. corn exports to Japan during the year of initial contamination. The 
dashed line shows weekly average exports to Japan over the previous three years. Figure 1 reveals 
that for several weeks in 2000, export sales were down from the average over the previous three 
years. In July 2000, export sales dropped sharply to 100,000 mt from a three-year average of 
300,000 mt. This drop is consistent with results from the Japanese testing of inbound U.S. corn.    7
In February 2001, the USDA’s Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration 
(GIPSA) issued a directive on sampling and testing for StarLink corn.  GIPSA calculated 
statistical confidence levels for approved StarLink testing procedures.  Figure 2 displays the 
essential GIPSA results.  The horizontal axis in Figure 2 shows the hypothetical percentage of 
StarLink in a single cargo of corn.  The vertical axis shows the corresponding “false positive” 
probability of accepting a cargo as non-StarLink. Suppose a cargo of corn is destined for Japan 
and the actual level of contamination is one tenth of one percent (i.e., 0.10 percent), shown by 
point X in Figure 2.  GIPSA found that there is more than a 9 percent chance that the cargo in 
question would be falsely determined to be StarLink free through accepted testing procedures.  
With a contamination level of 0.10 percent, there could be millions of kernels of StarLink tainted 
corn in this cargo, which could later show up in food products.  This example illustrates why it is 
almost impossible to meet a zero percent tolerance standard (Lin et al. 2002) and why the 
StarLink contamination caused such a serious market disturbance. The StarLink contamination 
event was particularly disruptive because a relatively large share of the market had zero tolerance 
for its use.  In total, zero-tolerance markets accounted for up to 25 percent of the demand for U.S. 
corn. 
  We hypothesize that the customers for U.S. corn with a zero-tolerance standard knew that this 
standard was virtually impossible to meet and therefore faced a high probability of buying 
contaminated corn in 2000 or later. This possibility reduced the demand for U.S. corn. Because 
corn is storable, current prices are a function of both current demand and expected future demand, 
so the price would have dropped when traders realized that contamination was possible. This 
price drop estimates the willingness of the market to accept StarLink contamination of the corn 
supply. In the next section, we develop a method for estimating both the size and timing of this 
price drop. We then apply our method to the StarLink case.   8
III. Estimating the Price Impact 
 
A. Existing Methods 
  Several approaches to estimating the price impact of market news events exist in the 
literature. The three main approaches are: (i) compare average prices before and after the event, 
(ii) conduct an event study, and (iii) compare observed prices with predicted prices from a 
structural supply and demand model.  The distinguishing feature of each method is the way the 
benchmark price is computed. The benchmark price is an estimate of the price that would have 
existed had the event not occurred. In the first approach, the benchmark is the average price of the 
commodity over some prespecified period before the event. In the second approach, the 
benchmark price is computed using asset-pricing theory.  In the third approach, the benchmark 
price is computed from estimated supply and demand functions. 
The first method, comparing prices before and after the event, performs well when the event 
timing is known and when there are no other price shocks around the time of the event. Such 
other price shocks would contaminate the estimated price impact.  Connor (2001) uses this 
method to estimate the overcharges in the lysine price fixing conspiracy of 1992-1995. McKenzie 
and Thomsen (2001) use a variant of this method to study the effect of recalls for E. Coli on beef 
prices. McKenzie and Thomsen average over 55 different recall events, which yields a more 
powerful test for significance and helps reduce the noise from price shocks unrelated to E. Coli. 
This method can perform poorly when there is only one observation of the event because it is 
difficult to demonstrate a statistically significant effect using only pre- and post-event prices. 
Other methods obtain significant results by adding information to the problem in the form of a 
model structure, a longer time series, or other variables.  
The event study approach (MacKinlay 1997) uses portfolio theory to determine a benchmark 
price.  Because portfolio theory is readily applicable to stock prices, such studies often examine 
the impact of events on the stock prices of the companies involved, rather than estimating the   9
direct effect on a commodity price. Examples of event studies in agriculture include Thomsen and 
McKenzie’s (2001) study of beef recalls for E. Coli, Henson and Mazzocchi’s (2002) study of 
BSE in the UK, and Dohlman, Hall, and Somwaru’s (2002) analysis of regulation of biotech 
crops. As per the standard event study approach, these papers average over multiple companies 
that were affected by the incidents to produce a more powerful test for significance of the event. 
The effects of these events on the companies are heterogeneous, but these studies aim to estimate 
the average effect rather than separate effects on each company.  
The third method requires estimating a structural supply and demand model. Such a model 
enables testing for significant price impacts through structural break tests or by testing for the 
significance of shifter variables. For example, Burton and Young (1996) determine the effect of 
BSE on UK meat demand by estimating the effect of BSE related media reports. The literature on 
structural supply and demand models is extensive, in part because it is notoriously difficult to 
specify such models correctly. Misspecification can be costly when the goal of the analysis is to 
identify changes in structure; apparent changes in structure may result purely from an inadequate 
specification (Chalfant and Alston 1988).  
In the StarLink case, none of the three existing methods are optimal. The main drawback of 
the third method is the difficulty in correctly specifying a structural supply and demand system 
for the world corn market. Corn demand is very complicated because there are multiple 
customers, including domestic food, domestic feed, foreign food, and foreign feed. Each of these 
customers has a different demand function and would be affected differently by the StarLink 
incident. Nonetheless, it is possible that a carefully constructed structural model could yield 
insight into the effects of the StarLink incident.  
The first two methods are not well suited to the StarLink case because we only have one 
observation of the event and the event date is not known with certainty. Also, traditional event 
studies use portfolio theory to determine the benchmark, whereas corn price dynamics are usually 
explained using rational storage models (Williams 1987). Empirically, the common event study   10
approach of using broad stock indices as benchmarks may lack precision because corn price 
changes are almost uncorrelated with stock index returns (Dusak, 1973). Next, we propose an 
approach to estimating price impacts that takes advantage of the high quality price data that are 
available for many commodities. This method applies not only to the StarLink case, but could 
also be used for other price impact studies of rare events. 
 
B.  The Relative Price of a Substitute (RPS) Method 
Our method uses the time series behavior of the price of the commodity of interest relative to 
a substitute good to make inference about the price impact of a market event. This approach 
brings extra information to the problem in the form of the price of a substitute good, but avoids 
the specification problems associated with the estimation of a full structural supply and demand 
model. Instead of estimating a full structural model, we focus on the implications of such a model 
for relative price dynamics. We identify these dynamic properties, test if they are stable before 
the event, and determine whether they change after the event. A change in a previously stable 
relative price implies a change in the underlying supply and demand structure and enables direct 
estimation of the price impact of the event. In essence, the RPS method is a reduced form 
approach that avoids the potential specification error associated with estimating a structural 
system, and it allows for inference when data on quantities and other arguments of the supply and 
demand functions are unavailable.  
As a simple example to motivate the RPS method, consider a simple two-good economy 
where consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences and where the supply curves for the two goods 
are perfectly inelastic. From the inverse demand functions, the relative prices have the following 
structure: 
  ) / log( )) 1 /( log( ) / log( 1 2 2 1 t t t t Q Q P P + − = θ θ ,             ( 1 )  
where Pit is the price of good i in period t, Qit denotes the quantity of good i in period t, and θ is 
the Cobb-Douglas parameter. If there are no relative technology shocks, then the relative quantity   11
and the relative price are both constant. If preferences (θ) change, then the log relative price 
changes according to equation (1). Similarly, if relative technology changes, then the relative 
quantity and the relative price both change.  Thus, one can test for a change in preferences or 
relative technology by testing for a change in the relative price. 
In this simple example, the relative price is insulated from income shocks and from any 
technology shocks that may affect the supply of each good equally. By eliminating these shocks, 
we make it easier to identify preference and relative technology shocks. The assumptions of 
Cobb-Douglas preferences and perfectly inelastic supply are too simplistic for most applications. 
However, whatever the supply and demand characteristics of the commodity and its substitute, 
one can always write down an expression for the relative price as a function of quantities and of 
supply and demand shifters such as income, factor prices, and prices of other goods, i.e., 
  ) , , ( ) / log( 2 1 2 1 t t t t t Z Q Q g P P = ,                ( 2 )  
where Zt denotes supply and demand shifters and g(⋅) is an unspecified function. To test for a 
change in preferences or relative technology, one needs to test for a change in the relative price 
function  g. Our insight is that such a test need not require that the function g be correctly 
specified or even that it be specified at all. 
  To see why the function g(⋅) in (2) does not need to be estimated, consider again the Cobb-
Douglas example in (1). Suppose that  ) / log( 1 2 t t Q Q  varies over time, but has a constant mean. In 
other words, suppose that relative technology is subject to temporary shocks, but reverts back to 
its mean value in the long run.  These temporary shocks induce serial correlation in  ) / log( 2 1 t t P P . 
Thus, to test for a change in preferences or relative technology, one could test for a change in the 
mean of  ) / log( 2 1 t t P P  allowing for serial correlation. There is no need to include data on 
quantities in this test because the serial correlation captures the essential dynamic features of the 
quantity data. Obviously, if quantity data were available, one could test for a change in the mean 
relative price conditional on quantity. Such a test would be more powerful than the unconditional   12
test, but may be severely biased if the conditional mean function were not correctly specified 
(Chalfant and Alston 1988).  
In general, if supply and demand shifters have only a transitory effect on relative prices, then 
a shift in the mean relative price implies a change in preferences or relative technology. If, 
however, these shifter variables have permanent effects on relative prices, then the mean relative 
price is not constant, even if preferences and relative technology are constant. In other words, if 
these variables have permanent effects on relative prices, then the relative price contains a unit 
root and any changes in preferences or relative technology cannot be identified separately from 
shocks to the shifter variables. Therefore a breaks test could falsely attribute to the market event a 
level shift induced by the shifter variables. This result emanates from a failure of “conditional 
independence given predictive proxies” (White, 2006), i.e., the shifter variables are not included 
in the analysis, but are correlated with the event under study. 
To identify the price impact in this context, one must first find a cointegrating relationship 
between relative prices and other relevant variables not caused by the market event. This 
cointegrating relationship provides a stable conditional mean function for the relative price, and 
therefore a parameter shift in the cointegrating relationship indicates a change in preferences or 
technology. Thus, the RPS method requires a stable pre-event relative price relationship of the 
form 
t t t t u Z P P + ′ + = β μ ) / log( 2 1 ,               ( 3 )  
where  ut is a stationary random variable and Zt denotes supply and demand shifters. The Zt 
variables contain a unit root and are only needed in the analysis if the log relative price is not 
stationary. To determine whether an event has a significant price impact, we test for a shift in the 
parameter μ during the event.
3  
                                                           
3 In principle, a change in preferences or relative technology could also change β. In such a case, the price 
impact would be nonstationary and a function of Zt. Although the RPS method applies to such cases, we 
focus our discussion on the case of a constant price impact.   13
Testing for parameter shifts, or structural breaks, has a long history in the econometrics and 
statistics literature. When there is one known break date, the F-test of Chow (1960) is commonly 
used. When the break point is unknown, statistical inference becomes more difficult because the 
usual  F-statistic has a nonstandard distribution. Many authors, including Andrews, Lee, and 
Ploberger (1996), have addressed this problem. When the number of possible break points is 
unknown, the problem becomes even more complicated. Bai and Perron (1998) solve this 
problem with a testing strategy that searches for the number and location of the breaks 
simultaneously. The test statistics proposed by Bai and Perron are sup-F tests, i.e., the relevant 
test statistic is the maximum F-statistic over all possible break points. In other words, it is the 
maximum value of the familiar Chow (1960) test. The Bai-Perron tests apply to stationary data, 
i.e., tests for a change in μ in (3) in the case where there are no Z variables.  For nonstationary 
data with cointegration, Hansen (1992) and Hansen (2003), among others, have proposed breaks 
tests. 
The RPS method enables estimation of the timing of the event. Whereas the econometrician 
may know approximately when the event occurred, the exact time that it hit the market is often 
unknown. Using structural break tests for unknown break points (e.g., Bai and Perron 1998), the 
RPS method determines both whether a significant event occurred and when it occurred. The 
precision of this timing estimate varies depending on the characteristics of the event. For storable 
commodities, news of current or future changes in preferences or relative technology leads to an 
immediate price effect and so the timing of the event can be precisely estimated. On the other 
hand, market developments such as a gradual increase in relative production efficiency generate a 
gradual change in the relative price and an imprecise estimate of the timing. Thus the precision of 
the estimate of the event timing reveals the nature of the event; precisely estimated event dates 
correspond to sudden market events. 
Once the significance and timing of the event have been determined from the relative price 
dynamics, the final step is to estimate the impact on the absolute price of each good. This   14
estimation requires decomposing the relative price change into the absolute price changes for 
each of the two goods. To estimate the price impact (PI) for each good, we compare observed 
prices after the break to forecasts made under the assumption that the event did not occur. The 
price impact of the event equals the mean forecast error. The precision of the forecasting model 
does not affect the validity of this method, although if the forecasting model is known to be 
accurate, then the PI estimates will be more precise. We assume only that the forecasting model is 
unbiased and that the forecast error variance can be estimated using pre-event data. Thus, for 
example, the forecasting model could use a much shorter sample than the breaks tests if the 
absolute price dynamics are less stable than relative prices.  
To improve the precision of the PI estimates, we use the magnitude of the shift in the relative 
price, which is estimated as part of the breaks testing procedure. Specifically, the difference 





where the subscripts b and a indicate values of the parameter μ in (3) before and after the event, 
respectively, and 
0
1 PI  and 
0
2 PI  denote the true price impacts for the two goods. Estimates of μa 
and μb arise as by-products of the breaks tests. 
Assuming that the forecasts are unbiased in the absence of the market event, the mean 
forecast error for good one equals 
0
1 PI  and the mean forecast error for good two equals 
) (
0
1 b a PI μ μ − − . Because the forecasts are made over various horizons, and because they are 
made using the same information set, the forecast errors are heteroskedastic and correlated. Thus, 
we estimate 
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ι is a 2h×1 vector of ones, and ε1 and ε2 denote h×1 vectors of forecast errors for the prices of 
goods one and two over the h periods following the break. To estimate Ω under the null 
hypothesis of zero price impact, we apply the forecasting model to pre-event data and compute 
the variance-covariance matrix of the pre-event forecast errors. Using standard formulas, the 
standard error of PI1 is 
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 Thus, a standard 95% confidence interval for PI is ( )
2 / 1 1
1
2 / 1 1
1 ) ( 2 , ) ( 2
− − − − Ω ′ + Ω ′ − ι ι ι ι PI PI . 
The precision of the price impact estimate depends on how accurate the forecasting model is; 
from the expression in (5), the smaller is the forecast error variance, Ω, the smaller is the standard 
error. The precision of PI1 is also likely to be greater if the price impact occurs abruptly.  Given 
that forecasts of more distant prices are less accurate than forecasts of nearby prices, the longer 
the forecast horizon required to capture the price impact, the more likely that the estimate will be 
significantly contaminated by other shocks. Alternatively, if the price impact is abrupt, then it is 
easier to separate it from other price shocks. 
In summary, the RPS method involves three steps: 
1)  Test for a stable (conditional) mean relative price before the event, 
2)  Test for a break in the (conditional) mean relative price around the event, and 
3)  Estimate price impact as the weighted average error in forecasts of post-event prices. 
In the next section, we use the RPS method to estimate the price impact of the StarLink 
contamination event. To conclude this section, we make several remarks about the RPS method. 
Remark 1.  Because it makes inference from a time series containing a single market event, 
the RPS method only identifies a sustained change in the parameters of the supply and demand 
system. It does not identify transitory shocks that affect relative prices and then decay quickly.   16
This feature of the RPS method implies that a stationary relative price (or a stable cointegrating 
relationship between the relative price and some other variables as in (3)) is synonymous with the 
absence of a sustained change in preferences or relative technology. To identify short-lived 
preference or relative technology shocks, one requires multiple observations of the event as in the 
event study approach, or careful analysis of the type in White (2006). 
Remark 2.  The usefulness of the RPS method for identifying changes in preferences and 
relative technology depends on the frequency of changes in these features. If they change 
frequently, then it is difficult to identify a particular change due to a particular event. If these 
changes are rare, then tests for changes are more powerful. Similarly, the closer is the price 
relationship between the two goods, i.e., the less serial correlation in the relative price, the more 
powerful is the method. These features suggest that finding a substitute good with a stable close 
relationship with the good of interest is an important component of the RPS method. 
Remark 3.  A cost of avoiding structural estimation is that the RPS method does not capture 
events that impact the prices of both goods. For example, if a change in preferences reduces 
demand for both goods equally, then relative prices will not change. Thus, the RPS method is 
most efficient when the chosen substitute good is not directly affected by the event under study. 
Remark 4.  By focusing on relative prices we filter out shocks that are common to both prices, 
which enables testing for a significant price effect without specifying a full demand and supply 
system. Our focus on relative prices is also important because absolute commodity price series 
are very persistent and typically contain a unit root (Ardeni 1989, Goodwin and Piggott 2001). 
When a series contains a unit root, every shock has a permanent effect on the price, making it 
impossible to identify a particular permanent shock without filtering out the shocks that are not of 
interest.   17
IV. Results for the StarLink Case 
 
A.  Relationship between Corn and Sorghum Prices 
The RPS method applies to the StarLink case because the contamination comprised a single 
market event that potentially had a sustained impact on corn prices. Furthermore, corn possesses a 
close substitute in sorghum. Over 90 percent of U.S. sorghum is used for animal feed and it is the 
second most important U.S. feed grain behind corn. Globally, 50 percent of sorghum is used for 
human food although the majority of U.S. sorghum exports go into animal feed. The bushel 
weight and nutritional values of sorghum are the same as for corn, which makes it a very close 
animal feed substitute for corn. Furthermore, sorghum has no GM varieties, meaning that both 
domestic and foreign customers looking to avoid StarLink contamination could have substituted 
towards sorghum. However, even if no feed customers substituted sorghum for corn and the 
entire reduction in corn demand originated from human food customers, the relative price of corn 
to sorghum would still have fallen and the RPS method would apply directly.  
The relative price of corn to sorghum was remarkably stable over a long period of time 
leading up to the StarLink incident. From January 1980 through December 1989, the average 
difference between monthly log corn and sorghum prices at the Louisiana Gulf was 0.060, or 
about 6 percent.
4 From January 1990 through December 1999, the average log price difference 
was very similar at 0.057. During this latter 10-year period, the relative production of corn 
doubled. Specifically, the annual sorghum crop averaged about 10 percent of the annual corn crop 
during the 1980s, but through the 1990s this ratio dropped steadily, reaching 5 percent by the end 
of the decade. Nonetheless, relative prices fluctuated around the same level throughout the two 
decades, indicating that demand for the two commodities is very elastic, which is implied by 
close substitutability. From January 2000 through September 2002, the average log price 
difference between corn and sorghum was –0.016. Thus, corn went from commanding a 6 percent 
                                                           
4 These data measure monthly average export bids for grain delivered to Gulf export elevators. The data are 
publicly available at the website http://www.ers.usda.gov.    18
premium over sorghum before 2000 to a 2 percent price discount after 2000. This 2000-2002 
period includes the StarLink contamination event because there was no significant volume of 
StarLink in the market prior to the end of 1999.  
To isolate the exact period over which StarLink influenced corn prices, we apply the RPS 
method using daily data. The data are daily spot prices and the sample begins in January 1989 and 
runs through August 2002. The corn prices are average daily processor bids in the central Illinois 
market and the sorghum prices are average daily bids from the Louisiana Gulf market. The data 
source is the Commodity Research Bureau.  The central Illinois and Louisiana Gulf spot markets 
are among the most liquid in corn and sorghum, respectively.  
Prior to 2000, the mean log relative price in these data averaged –0.09, which is 0.15 less than 
the average of 0.06 for monthly Gulf corn and sorghum. This difference of 0.15 reflects the cost 
of transportation of corn from Illinois to the Gulf. While the spatial price difference between 
central Illinois and the Gulf could add noise to the analysis, the use of prices from liquid markets 
reduces noise in the estimated price impact. Nonetheless, we check the robustness of our results 
to the market location and to the relatively short sample using monthly USDA data from Kansas 
City and the Louisiana Gulf. 
  We illustrate the long-term stability of the relative price before the commercial production of 
StarLink by showing that absolute corn and sorghum prices were cointegrated with a (1, –1) 
cointegrating vector. We do this by demonstrating presence of a unit root in log prices but no unit 
root in the log relative price. Such cointegration between corn and sorghum can be represented by 
the equation 
   t t t z s c + = − μ ) (                   ( 6 )  
where ct denotes the log price of corn, st denotes the log price of sorghum, and zt is a stationary 
error term. We apply the augmented Dickey-Fuller test to (ct – st) and present the results in Table 
2. The test strongly indicates that the prices of corn and sorghum were cointegrated prior to 2000; 
both price series contain a unit root, but that the relative price is mean reverting. Next, we use the   19
structural break tests of Bai and Perron (1998) to determine whether or not the relative price 
remained stable through the period containing the StarLink incident.  
 
B.  Structural Break Tests for Stability 
Having found a cointegrating relationship between corn and sorghum over the decade from 
1989-99, we expand the sample to include the StarLink period and test for stability in the relative 
price. A break in the relative price indicates that whatever shocks caused the break had a lasting 
impact on the parameters.  The cointegration results in Table 2 suggest that there were no pre-
2000 breaks (otherwise cointegration would have been rejected), so the breaks tests provide a 
robustness check on the cointegration results, as well as providing tests for the impact of the 
StarLink event. We test for a break in the parameter μ in (6) using the Bai-Perron testing 
procedure.  
The procedure of Bai and Perron (1998) begins with a test of the null hypothesis of zero 
breaks against the alternative of one break. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the first break is 
taken as given and a test is conducted for a second break. The procedure continues until the null 
hypothesis of no further breaks is not rejected. All test statistics in this method are sup-F tests, 
i.e., the relevant test statistic is the maximum F-statistic over all possible break points. In other 
words, it is the maximum value of the familiar Chow (1960) test. To improve the robustness of 
their procedure, Bai and Perron also suggest performing a double-maximum test, which is the 
maximum F-statistic over all possible break points and over the total number of breaks. This 
statistic provides a test against the alternative hypothesis of some unspecified number of breaks. 
The results from breaks tests are given in Table 3. All tests provide strong evidence of a break in 
mid July of 2000. The sequential procedure of Bai and Perron suggests that there are two breaks, 
the first in July 2000, and the second in December 2001. As expected, the procedure detects no 
breaks prior to 2000.   20
The findings of the breaks tests are consistent with Figure 3, which shows the log relative 
price of corn and sorghum through the whole sample. From 1989-2000, the log-relative price 
never traveled far from its mean of –0.09, apart from a brief spike during the corn shortage of 
1996.
5 In July 2000, the log relative price dropped abruptly to –0.24, which translates into 
approximately a 15 percent drop in the relative price. This drop occurred within two weeks, 
beginning on July 17, as indicated by the breaks tests. The abruptness of the drop indicates that it 
was a swift market reaction to a piece of news, rather than a gradual evolution towards a new 
equilibrium. The relative price remained low for about a year and a half until December 2001, 
when it began to creep up towards its previous value. By the summer of 2002 the average log 
relative price had increased to –0.15, which is two thirds of the way back to its original point.  
To test the robustness of our breaks tests to the market location and to the relatively short 
sample, we supplement our daily data with monthly data spanning the period 1975-2002. These 
data provide 14 more years of pre-StarLink data than are available at the daily frequency. We use 
monthly corn prices in the central Illinois, Kansas City, and Louisiana Gulf markets and monthly 
sorghum prices for Kansas City and the Gulf.
6  These data enable us to test whether the relative 
price of corn and sorghum was stable not only for the 11 pre-StarLink years back to 1989, but the 
25 years back to 1975. Also, by using corn and sorghum prices from the same markets, we 
control for any possible changes in the cost structure along the supply chain for these 
commodities. 
  We apply the Bai-Perron tests to the relative price of corn and sorghum in the Gulf market 
and in the Kansas City market. For both markets, the test procedure finds only one break in the 
sample. This break was in July 2000. We also apply the Bai-Perron tests to the monthly relative 
                                                           
5 Due to a poor harvest in 1995, total stocks of corn were lower during the summer of 1996 than at any 
point since 1976. These low stocks caused a brief spike in the price of corn that quickly reversed itself; the 
breaks tests presented in Table 3 show that this episode did not constitute a statistically significant mean 
shift. 
6 These data are publicly available at http://www.ers.usda.gov. The Kansas City data measure truck bids for 
grain delivered to Kansas City and the Gulf data measure export bids for grain delivered to Gulf export 
elevators.   21
price of central Illinois corn to Gulf sorghum. The results mirror those for daily data with these 
markets and also indicated one break in July 2000. None of the monthly relative price series 
indicate a second break in December 2001, as found with the daily data. This result arises because 
December 2001 is too close to the end of the sample in the monthly data. These tests indicate that 
the relationship between corn and sorghum after July 2000 was different than it had been at any 
time since at least 1975. 
Both the daily and monthly analyses point to a break in the relative price of corn and sorghum 
that occurred two months before the Washington Post reported that StarLink had been found in 
taco shells. Given that the U.S. grain handling system was not prepared to handle the split 
licensing of StarLink, it is likely that traders foresaw the impending disaster and substituted away 
from corn towards sorghum. This evidence is supported by Japan’s decision to start testing for 
StarLink in April 2000 and by information from Aventis early in 2000 suggesting possible 
contamination.  
The minimal reaction of corn and sorghum prices to the Washington Post article further 
indicates that the article was not news to the market. On Monday September 18, the day of the 
article, the central Illinois corn price was unchanged from the previous Friday at $1.54 per bushel. 
On Tuesday September 19, the price dropped to $1.51, but it was back up to $1.60 by the end of 
the week. During this same week, the price of sorghum increased, leading to a slight drop in the 
relative price of corn to sorghum. The log relative price averaged –0.27 during the week 
preceding the article, –0.30 during the week of the article, and –0.29, –0.27, and –0.23 in the 
three following weeks. Thus, any effect of the Washington Post story on corn prices was minor 
and disappeared within two weeks. This result is consistent with that of Golub et al. (2004), who 
applied the event study method to stock returns for 17 agribusiness firms with links to the corn 
industry. Only one of the 17 companies, Corn Products International, exhibited significant 
negative abnormal returns around September 18. Moreover, on Friday September 15 Corn 
Products International announced a 40 percent drop in expected third quarter earnings for reasons   22
unrelated to StarLink. Therefore, the significant result for this company was likely unrelated to 
the StarLink event. 
Although the breaks tests show that the relative price of corn and sorghum dropped by 15 
percent, the tests do not reveal how much of the relative price drop was due to a decrease in the 
price of corn and how much was due to an increase in the price of sorghum. In the final step in 
the RPS method, we estimate the price impacts on corn and sorghum as the weighted average 
error in forecasts of post-event prices.  
 
C.  Estimating the Price Impact 
  Because corn and sorghum prices are cointegrated, we form an error correction model (ECM) 
for forecasting. An ECM exists whenever there is cointegration in a set of time series (Engle and 
Granger 1987). The ECM is: 
  ct t c t c t c t s L c L z c ε δ γ α + Δ + Δ + = Δ − − − 1 1 1 ) ( ) (         
   st t s t s t s t s L c L z s ε δ γ α + Δ + Δ + = Δ − − − 1 1 1 ) ( ) (            ( 7 )  
where ) (L c γ , ) (L c δ , ) (L s γ , and  ) (L s δ  are polynomials in the lag operator and  μ − − = t t t s c z  
is the error correction term as defined in equation (6). The parameters αc and αs measure the 
response of corn and sorghum prices to deviations from the long-run trend. The closer αc and αs 
are to zero, the longer it takes for the series to revert to their long-run trend after a shock. 
Table 4 presents the estimates of the ECM using daily data up to the end of 1999, i.e., before 
the StarLink contamination. The estimated value of the error correction parameter for corn, αc, is 
–0.024. This value indicates that on average the daily corn price adjusts to correct 2.4 percent of 
any deviation from the long-run trend, implying that the half-life of a typical shock is 28.5 trading 
days, i.e., just less than 6 weeks. This reversion is somewhat slow but is significantly different 
from zero. The slow reversion indicates that corn and sorghum can deviate from their long-run 
relationship for long time periods. The error correction parameter for sorghum is –0.005 and is   23
not significantly different from zero, indicating that it is primarily the corn price that reacts to 
restore the long-run equilibrium relationship between these two commodities.  
Using the ECM, we forecast corn and sorghum prices from July 17, 2000, which is the 
breakpoint suggested by the Bai-Perron tests. The forecast horizon ends on August 25, six weeks 
after the breakpoint. This interval allows time for the price series to settle at new levels after the 
break.  For each day in this six-week period, we compute the difference between the observed 
prices and the forecasts made on July 14, the last trading day before the break. Figure 4 shows the 
forecast errors for corn and sorghum, as well as the forecast error in the log relative price. It is 
evident that the initial shock on July 17 manifested itself in the Gulf sorghum market. Over the 
two days from July 17, the price of sorghum jumped 8 percent above what was expected. It 
wasn’t until the following week of July 24-28 that the central Illinois corn price reacted, dropping 
by 6.5 percent. On Friday July 28, two weeks after the initial shock, the log corn price was 0.064 
below its predicted value and log sorghum was 0.081 above its predicted value. By this time, the 
total forecast error on the relative price was –0.145, which is close to the total relative price 
change of –0.154 estimated in the breaks analysis above. Both variables stayed at these levels for 
a full six weeks until the end of August.  
To estimate the price impact on corn, we apply the weighted least squares method in equation 
(4) to the forecast errors over this six-week horizon. We obtain a price impact estimate of –0.068 
for corn, with a standard error of 0.013, implying that a 95 percent confidence interval for the 
price impact is (–0.042, –0.094). Because these numbers measure log changes and are small, they 
can be interpreted as approximate percentage changes. Thus, we can be 95 percent confident that 
the interval between –4.2 percent and –9.4 percent contains the true corn price effect. 
To compare this estimate to that from a conventional event study, we took July 17 as the 
event date and performed an event study using daily log returns on the Russell 3000 stock index 
(rt) as the benchmark. We estimated the equation  tt t cr u α β Δ =+ + using data from 1/1/99-
7/10/00, and obtained the OLS estimates  ˆ 0.00 α =  and  ˆ 0.10 β =− . Over the two-week period   24
from July 17 to July 28, the estimated cumulative abnormal return on corn was 
ˆ ˆ ( ) 0.060 tt t CAR c r αβ =Δ − − = − ∑ .
7 Because the OLS estimate of β was not significantly 
different from zero, we repeated the analysis with β=0, and obtained  0.051 CAR = − . These CAR 
estimates are insignificantly different from zero, with 95 percent confidence intervals of (–0.125, 
0.027) and (–0.122, 0.026), respectively. Thus, the RPS method yields more precise estimates of 
the price impact than the event study method. Moreover, using the relative price of corn to 
sorghum enabled us to identify the event date using the RPS method, whereas we took this date as 
given for the event study estimate. 
The two largest price changes in the event period occurred on July 18 when the Gulf price of 
sorghum jumped from $1.78 to $1.90 per bushel and between July 21 and 26 when the central 
Illinois price of corn dropped from $1.54 to $1.47 per bushel. These two price changes are 
apparent in Figure 4 and constitute the majority of the relative price shift that was detected by the  
breaks tests in Table 3. The fact that there were no substantive shocks to either price for an entire 
month after the initial shocks increases confidence in the estimated price impact (PI). In fact, 
using forecast errors only for the two weeks up to July 28, the estimated PI is –0.067, compared 
to –0.068 for the six weeks up to August 25. When we extend the forecast horizon a further six 
weeks to October 6, the PI estimate becomes –0.074.  The PI estimate changes little when we 
extend the forecast horizon because the forecasts of distant corn and sorghum prices are 
imprecise, so they receive a low weight in the weighted least squares PI estimator and hardly 
influence the PI estimates.  
In the two weeks prior to July 17, 2000, both corn and sorghum prices drifted downwards.  
Consequently, beginning the event period before July 17 would increase the forecast errors and 
therefore the PI estimates of the effect on corn prices. However, because both corn and sorghum 
                                                           
7 The CAR equals the sum of the estimated abnormal returns over the window from July 17 – July 28, 
where abnormal returns are defined by the benchmark model  tt t cr u α β Δ =+ +, which in turn is motivated 
by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). See MacKinlay (1997) for more details on the event study 
method.   25
prices drifted in the same direction in these two weeks, it is unlikely that the StarLink effect 
began before the 17
th. Thus, we conclude that the StarLink contamination affected the market 




The U.S. is the world's largest producer and exporter of corn, and the large-scale production 
of genetically modified corn in the U.S. has generated international debate. The StarLink 
contamination incident heightened this debate. StarLink corn was first commercially grown in the 
United States in 1998 but was never approved by the U.S. government for human consumption. 
Instead, the Environmental Protection Agency issued a “split” license, approving the corn as safe 
only for animal consumption.  StarLink became commingled with non-StarLink corn and found 
its way into U.S. and foreign food products and bulk export cargoes. Upon the release of public 
news of this contamination, hundreds of food products were recalled.   
In this article, we develop the relative price of a substitute (RPS) method for evaluating the 
price impact of rare market events. We apply the RPS method to measure the price impact of the 
StarLink contamination on the U.S. corn market. Using the 25-year stable relationship between 
the prices of corn and sorghum, we find that the StarLink incident triggered about a 7 percent 
drop in the price of corn that persisted for at least a year. This result indicates that the market was 
willing to accept potentially contaminated corn only if it came at a significant price discount.  
The effects of the StarLink contamination extend well beyond the corn market. The StarLink 
case continues to surface around the world as an example of policy error in managing 
biotechnology adoption. Such use of the StarLink incident as a reason to restrict the propagation 
of GM crops will increase the future costs of developing and marketing biotech crops. The 
European Union points to the StarLink incident as evidence that GM crops cannot be properly 
segregated from non-GM crops. In responding to a case brought to the World Trade Organization   26
by the U.S. in May 2003, the EU Trade Directorate wrote “The StarLink case is a clear example 
of the need for appropriate rules for authorization and traceability of GMOs.” In the long run, 
these indirect negative effects on GM crop adoption may far outweigh the direct effect on corn 
prices. In retrospect, the U.S. grain handling system was not prepared to handle the split licensing 
of StarLink. 
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Table 1–  Testing for StarLink in Japan’s Feed Corn Imports 
 
Time Period  Positive Ratio  Commingling 
Concentration 
 
April 2000 to September 2000 
 




October 2000 to March 2001 
 




April 2001 to September 2001 
 




October 2001 to March 2002 
 




April 2002 to September 2002 
 
4/42 (9.5 %) 
 
0.10 % 
Notes:  Source is U.S. Embassy, Japan “Update on Japan’s Biotechnology Safety Approval and 
Labeling Policies” GAIN Report #JA3002, February 28, 2003. 
  
 
Table 2 – Pre-StarLink Cointegration Tests 
  Test Statistic  5% Critical Value  Conclusion 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests 
Corn  –1.72 –2.86  Unit  Root 
Sorghum –1.93  –2.86  Unit  Root 
      
Log Relative Price  –4.33  –2.86  Cointegration 
Note:  The ADF test regressions contained an intercept and two lags.  Sample period is Jan 1989 – 
Dec 1999.  
 
Table 3– Bai-Perron Tests for Breaks in the Cointegrating Relationship 
Test Statistic  5% Critical 
Value 
Date of maximal 
F-statistic  Conclusion 
 
UDmax 148.65  10.17  -  # breaks ∈ {1,2,3,4,5,6} 
WDmax 162.12  10.91  -  # breaks ∈ {1,2,3,4,5,6} 
        
sup-F(1|0)  148.65  9.63  7/17/00  At least 1 break 
sup-F(2|1)  28.57  11.14  12/14/01  At least 2 breaks 
sup-F(3|2) 3.49 12.16  2/16/96  2  breaks 
Note: Maximum number of breaks set to six and minimum regime size to 5 percent of sample. Robust 
standard errors with AR(1) prewhitening used for all tests (Bai and Perron, 1998). Sample period is Jan 
1989 – Aug 2002.  
   
 
Table 4– Pre-StarLink Error Correction Mechanism Estimates 
Parameter Corn  Sorghum 
μ  –0.09 
 (0.01) 
 
α  –0.024 
  (0.005) 
 
–0.005 
  (0.005) 
 






γ2  –0.002 









  (0.025) 
 
















Note: Sample period is Jan 1989–Dec 1999.Estimation by maximum 
likelihood. Autocorrelation test is LM test for first order serial 
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Figure 1. Weekly U.S. Corn Export Sales to Japan   
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Note:  Horizontal axis is percent of corn kernels containing Cry9C protein,based on a 2400 kernel 
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Note: The corn series measures mean daily bids in the central Illinois market. The sorghum series measures 
mean daily bids in the Louisiana Gulf. Prices are measured in cents per bushel.   
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Figure 4. Forecast Errors During StarLink Event  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 